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Abstract 
This paper aims at connecting Self-Determination Theory (SDT) with research on moral 
identity. It is argued that SDT provides a unique and integrative framework for 
addressing important questions that have guided research on moral identity for many 
years: What is a moral identity? How is it linked to moral action? How do moral 
identities develop? In the present paper, moral identity is conceptualized as a goal of 
moral action. Individuals want to maintain their moral identity, which in turn motivates 
them to act morally. Yet, moral identity motivation is not uniform. In line with SDT, it is 
possible to differentiate between more or less external and internal forms of moral 
identity motivation. The exact link between moral identity and moral action depends on 
the type of moral identity motivation involved. Development of moral identity trends 
towards more internal forms of moral identity motivation, which renders development an 
influential factor in shaping individuals' motivation to act morally.  
Key words: moral identity, Self-Determination Theory, moral motivation, moral 
development 
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Moral Identity as a Goal of Moral Action: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 
 What is a moral identity? How is it linked to moral action? How do moral 
identities develop? These questions are central to the field of moral identity research. 
They have been discussed numerous times in several comprehensive reviews (e.g., Hardy 
& Carlo, 2005, 2011; Hardy, Krettenauer, & Hunt, in press; Jennings, Mitchell, & 
Hannah, 2015). Typically, two major approaches to moral identity are identified and 
contrasted, "trait-based" versus "socio-cognitive" approaches. From a trait-based 
perspective, moral identity is a trait-like personality attribute that manifests in stable 
behavioural dispositions to act morally across contexts and time. From a socio-cognitive 
perspective, moral identity is a malleable self-schema that needs to be activated in a 
given situation to influence social information processing, decision-making and behavior. 
While these two major approaches capture most of the research in this field, they do not 
exhaust all theoretical options available. Walker (2014) for instance, introduced the so-
called personological approach to moral identity, while Stets and Carter (2012) provide a 
sociological account. However, even when considering the full range of theoretical 
offerings, Self-Determination Theory (SDT) as proposed by Edward Deci and Richard 
Ryan (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2018) is not among them. While some 
connections were drawn in the past between SDT and ego identity from an Eriksonian 
perspective (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2011), SDT has not been a serious contender in 
the field of moral identity research so far. This is puzzling as this theory tackles questions 
very similar to those faced by moral identity researchers: What motivates individuals to 
act? How is the self implicated in this motivation? How does motivation change over 
time as individuals experience various forms of feedback for their actions?  
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 This paper is meant to bridge the gap between SDT and moral identity research. It 
is based on the assumption that SDT can greatly inform moral identity research as it 
provides a unique perspective on central questions that have been guiding this field of 
research for a long time. In brief, the following answers will be given to the three guiding 
questions cited above: (1) What is a moral identity? - Moral identity can be considered a 
goal of moral action. Individuals want to maintain their moral identity, which in turn 
motivates them to act morally. Note that this conceptualization of moral identity does not 
directly follow from a SDT perspective. Yet, as will be argued below, SDT suggests such 
a view. (2) How is moral identity linked to moral action? - Moral identity motivation is 
not uniform. In line with SDT, it is possible to differentiate between more or less external 
and internal forms of moral identity motivation. The exact link between moral identity 
and moral action depends on the type of moral identity motivation involved. (3) How 
does moral identity develop?  - Development of moral identity trends towards more 
internal forms of moral identity motivation, which renders development an influential 
factor in shaping individuals' moral motivation.  
 In the following sections these propositions will be further elaborated and 
substantiated. For doing so, we will draw from various areas of research across the broad 
field of moral psychology. We will rely on important conceptual distinctions and well-
established empirical findings, some from our own research projects. Thus, the present 
paper weaves together various lines of arguments in order in order to drive home one 
major point: SDT provides an integrative perspective for addressing questions moral 
identity researchers have been grappling with since Blasi introduced the concept in the 
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1980s (Blasi, 1983; 1984). This perspective opens up promising avenues for new research 
and broadens the scope of moral identity research. 
Moral identity as a goal of moral action 
 Moral identity is commonly defined as "the degree to which being a moral person 
is important to an individual’s identity" (Hardy & Carlo, 2005, p. 212). While this 
definition captures the subjective experience of having a moral identity, it does not 
explicate moral identity as a psychological construct. What is moral identity from the 
perspective of psychological theory? It has been argued that moral identity can be 
conceptualized on various levels of abstraction that are all pertinent for describing the 
moral person (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). Following McAdams' framework of 
personality (e.g., McAdams, 2015), moral identity can be conceptualized (a) as a trait-
like attribute, (b) as a context-specific adaptation and goal-orientation, and (c) as a 
narrative. On the broadest, most abstract, and least contextualized level, moral identity 
consists of those moral qualities individuals ascribe as important to themselves in general 
(e.g., being honest, responsible, principled, etc.). On an intermediate level, moral 
identities are represented by different goal-orientations individuals maintain in various 
areas of their life (e.g., being a caring parent and a fair-minded colleague). On the least 
abstract level, moral identities are expressed in life stories about moral achievements and 
failures in people’s lives. These life stories mitigate discrepancies and inconsistencies 
among conflicting self-aspects (McAdams, 1993) and sustain a personal sense of moral 
agency (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). Evidently, the intermediate level of context-
specific adaptations and goal-orientations is most akin to SDT as context-dependent 
personal goals play a pivotal role in this theory. Thus, from a SDT perspective moral 
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identity is best conceptualized as a goal of moral action within McAdams' framework of 
personality. Individuals act morally in order to uphold their moral identity. Put 
differently, moral actions are instrumental for moral identity maintenance. This statement 
may sound straightforward. It nonetheless requires further explanation and elaboration. 
 The philosophically minded reader may find the conceptualization of moral 
identity as a goal of moral action highly implausible as it appears to deny what it wants to 
explain: moral action. An action needs to be motivated by the desire to do what is 
considered morally right or good in order to qualify as moral (Blasi, 2005). If the goal 
simply is to bolster one's sense of self, the action appears to be devoid of any moral 
meaning. Ethical egoism seems to be logically implied (Nucci, 2004). However, this is 
not the case. Any human action is part of a chain of proximal desires or intentions and 
more distal goals that often form goal hierarchies (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). For 
instance, someone regularly walks or bikes to the office in the morning because they 
want to use the car less often. Using the car less, in turn, is motivated by the desire to 
reduce one's carbon footprint and to develop a more sustainable life-style. In a similar 
way, any honest, caring or fairness behavior can be motivated by the desire to do what is 
considered morally right or good and by the goal to maintain one's moral identity. One 
goal does not come at the expense of the other. Instead both can support each other. 
Moral identity as a goal adds another motive for moral action to the desire to do what is 
good or right (see Hardy, 2006). As a consequence, the motivation to act morally overall 
might become stronger, more reliable and more robust once it is backed by a moral 
identity. 
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 It is important to note, however, that the criteria for successful identity 
maintenance can vary. They can be rather externally defined by the acknowledgement 
and recognition individuals receive from others, or they can be internally defined by the 
personal confirmation of one's own self-view. Consequently, a moral identity can be 
associated with different motivations. Individuals may want to be recognized by others as 
respected members of their moral community (see Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013). 
Alternatively, individuals may seek confirmation of their own self-view as a form of self-
consistency or -coherence (see Lapsley & Stey, 2014). 
 Last but not least, moral identity as a goal does not always necessitate moral 
action. If action is instrumental for achieving the goal of moral identity maintenance, 
there might be other means for achieving this goal that are equally effective. Individuals 
may deny the moral significance of an action by using various strategies of moral 
disengagement (Bandura, 2016). They may, for instance, minimize the negative 
consequences of an action for others or deny their own responsibility to act. As a 
consequence, one's moral identity remains unaffected by whatever course of action is 
taken in a given situation. Even if such measures of moral disengagement are not 
available, individuals are not bound to act morally. Instead, they may choose to act 
immorally as they believe that they will be able to make up for any moral identity loss at 
a later point in time. Thus, moral identity maintenance is not static but a dynamic process 
that unfolds over extended periods of time. It is a balance individuals constantly seek to 
maintain as they pursue various goals in life, may they be moral, amoral, or immoral (see 
Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).  
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 Social-psychological research on moral balancing illustrates this view. This 
research demonstrates that past behavior influences individuals' readiness to engage in 
future moral action, depending on what self-image it invokes. If past behaviors question 
one's self-view as a moral person the readiness to engage in future prosocial or moral 
action tends to increase. If the past behavior confirms one's moral identity, people are 
more willing to excuse themselves when failing to act morally. This effect has been 
called moral licensing (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Moral licensing occurs across 
domains, for instance when volunteering for a charity organization leads to smaller 
monetary donations for other charitable causes (Blanken, Van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 
2015). Licensing effects are replicable and reliable, albeit small (Mullen & Monin, 2016). 
Strikingly, they are less strong when moral behavior is reflective of a strong identification 
with moral values (Conway & Peetz, 2012). This suggests that the motivation for why 
individuals want to uphold their moral identity moderates licensing effects. SDT provides 
a stringent theoretical explanation for this moderation, as will be demonstrated in the 
following section. 
Self-determination and moral identity motivation 
 SDT has been described as meta-theoretical framework that comprises several 
more specific mini-theories, such as Cognitive-Evaluation Theory, Organismic 
Integration Theory, Basic Psychological Needs Theory, and Goal Contents Theory (Ryan 
& Deci, 2018). The common denominator for all these mini-theories is the idea that 
individuals' motivation to act can be more or less external or internal to the self. If 
motivation is internal the action freely emanates from the self. It reflects what a person 
genuinely wants to do. If motivation is external, people feel coerced into doing something 
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they do not fully embrace. The prototypical example for internal motivation is the 
enjoyment of pursuing a pleasurable activity, such as engaging in sports or playing a 
musical instrument. External motivation by contrast is present when actions are 
instrumental for achieving standards and goals set by others.  
 According to Organismic Integration Theory, external and internal motivation is 
not binary but defines polar opposites on a continuum (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2012). There 
are other forms of motivation on this continuum that differ with regard to the degree of 
self-integration. Next to external motivation but somewhat more internal, is introjected 
motivation where external contingencies (such as the approval or disapproval of others) 
affect people's self-worth; maintaining this self-worth becomes an important motive for 
action. One step further towards internal motivation is identified motivation, where 
people accept the importance of a specific activity and act out of this acceptance. Finally, 
there is integrated motivation that occurs when identified motives become congruent with 
other personal needs, goals and self-ideals. As a consequence, it is not only the 
importance of an isolated activity, but its importance in relation to other goals that 
motivates action.  
 Note that these four types of motivation do not describe a sequence of stages, 
where a child proceeds from purely extrinsic to integrated motivation in a stage-like 
fashion. Ryan and Deci (2000) explicitly rule out that the various forms of motivation 
form a developmental continuum. Internal motivation can occur at any developmental 
period depending on the circumstances at hand. In line with this view, it has been 
demonstrated that even 18 months old infants spontaneously engage in helping or sharing 
without being asked or rewarded to do so (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). Thus, some 
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form of internal moral motivation is evident already in infancy (Hepach, Vaish, & 
Tomasello, 2013). 
 However, it is important to differentiate between moral behavior that emerges 
spontaneously without any internal struggles, on the one hand, and situations of 
conflicting goals, interests and desires, on the other. A child might be perfectly happy to 
share a bountiful resource with someone else and may be intrinsically motivated to do so 
because it is a pleasure to share. But what if the sharing involves personal costs? A 
teenager may strongly believe that cheating in an exam is unfair to others. But what if 
there is an equally strong desire to excel in the exam? In such situations, individuals need 
to be able to prioritize morality over other goals and desires, which requires a 
corresponding motivation to do so. 
 The motivation to prioritize morality over other conflicting goals and desires can 
derive from individuals' motivation to maintain a moral identity. As described in the 
previous paragraph, this motivation to maintain a moral identity can be more or less 
external or internal to the self. People may prioritize morality over other conflicting goals 
because they want to demonstrate their moral identity to others or to themselves. In this 
case, the motivation that derives from a person's moral identity is extrinsic or introjected. 
Alternatively, individuals may prioritize morality because they believe it is important and 
reflects the type of person they want to be. In this situation, moral identity motivation is 
identified or integrated. As will be demonstrated in the next section, these different forms 
of moral identity motivation link moral identity with moral action in systematic and 
meaningful, yet differential ways. Moreover, they provide a conceptual framework for 
describing important aspects of moral identity development.  
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 For the remaining sections of this paper, the distinction between internal and 
external moral identity motivation is pivotal. As pointed out before, these two forms of 
motivation are not binary but describe polar opposites on a continuum. Still, for the sake 
of brevity we will refer to them as two major categories of motivation as is common 
practise in the SDT literature (also referred to as controlled and autonomous motivation, 
e.g. Weinstein & Ryan, 2010).  
External versus internal moral identity motivation: Links to moral action 
 The distinction between external and internal moral identity motivation has not 
played any significant role in moral identity research to date. As Krettenauer (2011) 
pointed out, moral identity is often conceptualized as the centrality or importance of 
morality to an individual's sense of self without considering the motives for why being 
moral is deemed important. Yet, moral identity research has not been completely 
oblivious to this differentiation. The widely used Self-Importance of Moral Identity 
Questionnaire developed by Aquino and Reed (2002) speaks to it indirectly. This 
measure assesses individuals' moral identity along two dimensions, dubbed 
internalization and symbolization. Internalization defines moral identity inwardly as a 
personal striving. Symbolization, by contrast, focuses on publicly demonstrating moral 
behavior (e.g., I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have 
these characteristics [of a highly moral person]). Internalization and symbolization are 
conceptually related to internal and external moral identity motivation. If someone 
expresses the desire to be a moral person this reflects internal moral identity motivation. 
If someone stresses the importance of demonstrating moral behavior to others it indicates 
external motivation. 
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 Yet, the two scales represent the two forms of motivation only imperfectly as the 
two scales confound the two forms of motivations to some extent. This limitation 
particularly applies to the symbolization scale as some of the items simply state the desire 
to express one's moral identity in actual behavior without specifying any motives for 
doing so. It may be that individuals seek recognition from others, which is external, or 
want to act in accordance with their moral ideals, which is internal. Empirically, strong 
correlations of .60 and higher have been reported between internalization and internal 
moral identity motivation, whereas symbolization is more ambiguous (Krettenauer & 
Casey, 2015). It is moderately correlated with both external and internal motivation.  
 Against this backdrop, it is particularly noteworthy that the internalization scale 
repeatedly turned out to be the stronger and more reliably predictor of moral action than 
symbolization (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Jennings et al., 2015). Evidently, internal 
moral identity motivation as represented by the internalization scale is more effective in 
motivating moral action. This finding is in full agreement with SDT that generally 
stresses that internal motivation provides a stronger and more self-sustaining form of 
motivation as compared to external motivation (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 
2018). This stronger motivational impact is likely related to the emotions involved when 
engaging in moral actions. For instance, it has been shown that internally motivated 
helping behavior is experienced as more satisfying and self-rewarding than externally 
motivated helping behavior (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). In a similar vein, it was shown 
that internal motivation is positively correlated with authentic pride, that is positive 
feelings about one's moral action and the positive effect it has on others (Krettenauer & 
Casey, 2015). In contradistinction, external motivation is more strongly correlated with 
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hubristic pride, i.e., positive feelings derived from one's supposed moral superiority 
relative to others. Hubristic pride, in turn, is less strongly associated with prosocial 
behavior than authentic pride. 
 The differential impact of internal moral motivation on moral action does not only 
involve emotions but also cognitive mechanisms. The two mechanisms described in the 
previous paragraph that potentially undermine the link between moral identity and action, 
moral disengagement and moral licencing, are differentially associated with the two 
forms of moral identity motivation. Research demonstrates that strategies of moral 
disengagement are less effective when individuals score high on the moral identity 
internalization scale (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Hardy, Bean, & Olsen, 
2014). Thus, a strong internal moral identity motivation makes it more difficult to 
effectively disengage from one's own immoral behavior. In line with this finding it was 
found that individuals with high internal moral identity motivation dissociate themselves 
less from past immoral actions (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013) and are less defensive 
about them (Weinstein, Deci, & Ryan, 2011). Thus, internal moral identity motivation is 
associated with a stronger sense of responsibility likely because moral actions in general 
are experienced as more self-determined. 
 Moral identity motivation also moderates the influence of past moral behavior on 
future moral actions as described in research on moral licencing. It has been 
demonstrated that licencing effects depend on a variety of moderating factors (Mullen & 
Monin, 2016). While there is no empirical study that directly investigated the moderating 
role of moral identity motivation on moral licencing, licencing was found to be less 
strong or even turned into the opposite consistency effect when the past behavior reflects 
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an underlying value the individual strongly identifies with (Conway & Peetz, 2012). 
Value identification is indicative of a strong internal moral identity motivation. Thus, 
internal moral identity motivation is likely less prone to licensing effects.  
 Of course, all this does not imply that external moral identity motivation is 
incapable of motivating moral action. It does so, yet in different ways. If individuals who 
are externally motivated believe they need to maintain their status as a valued member of 
their moral community by behaving morally, they likely will do so (Winterich, Aquino, 
Mittal, & Swartz, 2013). This may even lead to what has been described as escalation of 
commitment (Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014), which occurs when individuals compete 
for social status gains through prosocial and cooperative behavior (see also Barclay, 
2012). However, when there is no such incentive, external moral identity motivation has 
little influence on moral action. It some situations, it may be possible to maintain a social 
moral identity without acting morally. In such situations, external moral identity 
motivation leads to what has been described as moral hypocrisy by Batson and others (for 
an overview see, Batson, 2016) . 
 In a series of experiments, Batson and colleagues demonstrated that individuals 
pretend to act morally but try to avoid the costs of being moral whenever possible 
(Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & 
Strongman, 1999). Similarly, Dana, Weber, and Kuang, (2007) found that leaving 
individuals with some "wiggle room" to serve their own self-interest while maintaining 
the illusion of fairness behavior in a dictator game makes them share less with their 
partner. According to Batson (2016) individuals are primarily motivated to appear moral 
while avoiding the costs of actually being moral whenever possible, which explains why 
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morality so often fails. While Batson's claims about the pervasiveness of hypocrisy 
motivation appear to be overstated (see Krettenauer, Bauer & Sengsavang, 2019), these 
studies nonetheless demonstrate important limitations of an external moral identity 
motivation. If moral identity motivation is purely external, moral actions are driven by 
external contingencies and the desire to maintain one's social status as a moral person. 
This can lead to strategic behavior when individuals try to appear moral without acting 
morally. 
 In sum, there is considerable support for the idea that the two forms of moral 
identity motivation are differentially linked to moral action. Thus, moral identity has 
different effects on moral action depending on whether it is external or internal. The 
impact of external moral identity motivation is contingent on whether one's actions 
influence the way others view the self. Internal moral identity motivation, by contrast, 
leads to the desire to maintain one's self-ideal. Internal motivation provides a stronger 
and more reliable link between moral identity and moral action and prevents individuals 
from merely creating the impression of being moral while avoiding the costs of acting 
morally. 
Moral identity motivation and development 
As pointed out by Krettenauer & Hertz (2015), a major limitation of the two leading 
approaches to moral identity (trait-based and socio-cognitive) is in the lack of a 
developmental account. From a trait-based perspective, the essence of moral identity is in 
stability over time, which is the opposite of developmental change. For socio-cognitive 
approaches, moral identity results from the repeated activation of moral self-schemas, 
which renders them more accessible and more influential in regulating social behavior 
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(Lapsley & Stey, 2014). The type of identity motivation that is triggered in a specific 
situation, may it be external or internal, is not of particular interest, nor are the factors 
that influence the importance of internal motivation relative to external motivation. 
However, since external and internal moral identity motivation are differentially linked to 
moral action, the question of what influences the importance of internal moral identity 
motivation relative to external motivation is of great significance. 
 One influential factor might be development. Various models of self, identity and 
moral development propose a general developmental trend towards higher levels of self-
determination and self-integration. As individuals grow older, life-goals, values and 
ideals are increasingly experienced as self-chosen (e.g. Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Hy & 
Loevinger, 1996; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993). Even 
Kohlberg's stage model of moral development suggests a decline in external and increase 
in internal motivation as adolescents move out of the preconventional Stages 1 and 2 and 
standards of individual conscience become more salient at the Stages 3-4 and 4 (Colby, 
Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983). In line with these models, SDT posits an 
organismic trend towards higher levels of self-integration. According to SDT, it is 
through identification of values and goals as one's own and self-integration that internal 
motivation develops. It is important to note, however, that this internal motivation 
requires supportive developmental contexts to occur (Deci & Ryan, 2014). Such context 
dependency is evident in contextual differences when goal-motivations in one area of life 
are highly internal (e.g., leisure activities) but may remain external in others (e.g., work).  
 Age-related increases in internal motivation over the life-span have been 
documented for personal goals (Sheldon & Kasser, 2001), for social role obligations 
MORAL IDENTITY AS A GOAL   17	
(Sheldon, Kasser, Houser-Marko, Jones, & Turban, 2005), and more recently also for 
moral identity motivation (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017). Krettenauer and Victor assessed 
moral identity motivation using a newly developed interview procedure. Participants 
were first asked to choose 12-15 values or virtues from a list of 80 to define a highly 
moral person from their personal point of view. All values on this list of 80 had been 
identified as prototypical descriptors of a highly moral person in previous research (for 
details see Krettenauer, Murua, & Jia, 2016). Participants were then asked to rate the self-
importance of these values by sorting them on a diagram with 'extremely important to me' 
at the core and 'unimportant to me' are at the periphery. They were asked to do this 
independently for three different contexts, namely family, work or school (depending on 
enrollment status) and community/the larger society. For those attributes that were put in 
the center of each diagram, interviewees were finally asked why these qualities were 
extremely important to them. Responses to this question were coded as external, internal 
or as relationship-oriented. External motives refer to self-interest or social reputation.  
Internal motives, by contrast, refer to self- and relationship ideals and/or one's desire to 
be a role model to others. Relationship-oriented motives refer to the good relationship 
one wants to keep with others and are neither clearly external nor internal. They were 
therefore kept as a separate category. 
 In a sample of 252 14 to 65 year old Canadian participants it was found that 
external motivation decreased from adolescence to adulthood, whereas relationship-
oriented motives did not evidence much age-related change (see Figure 1). Internal 
motivation, by contrast, increased from adolescence to adulthood. Moral identity 
motivation was not only related to age but to context, as well. In the work/school context 
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external moral identity motivation was clearly dominant, whereas in the family and 
community context all three types of moral identity motivation were on par (see Figure 
1). While this finding documents substantial context-dependency of moral identity in 
terms of mean level differences, moral identity motivations in the three contexts were 
nonetheless significantly correlated, with a median correlation of r = .31, p < .05. 
 Similar trends can be found in earlier developmental periods. In a follow up study 
with a sample of 9 to 15 year olds we used a similar method with slight modifications 
(for details see Sengsavang, 2018). In this study, we presented students a list of 13 
preselected moral values that are known to be important for defining a highly moral 
person particularly in this younger age period such as being honest, trustworthy, genuine, 
non-judgmental, responsible, and selfless. Participants were asked to rate the self-
importance of these values by sorting them on the same diagram with 'extremely 
important to me' at the core and 'unimportant to me' are at the periphery. They were asked 
to do this independently for three contexts, namely family, friends and school. The 
motives for why these values were extremely important were coded with a slightly 
revised coding manual that is more closely aligned with the organismic integration model 
as proposed by SDT. There were external responses, in which respondents referred to 
external standards and rules or negative consequences to the self (e.g., my parents want 
me to be honest; if I lie to others, they will lie to me too). There were introjected 
responses, referring to one's reputation or to consequences for relationships (e.g., I want 
my teacher to think of me as a reliable student, there won't be a trusting relationship 
anymore). There were identified reasons, where respondents refer to negative 
consequence of immoral actions for others and/or the golden rule. Finally, there were 
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integrated responses, in which participants explained the important of these moral 
qualities by referring to their own self- or relationship ideals. For three out of four of 
these motivational categories we found significant age-related differences in line with the 
idea that moral identity motivation becomes more internal with age. External and 
introjected motivation decreased from late childhood to mid adolescents whereas 
identified and integrated motivation increased (see Figure 2). Again, as in the first study, 
there was considerable context dependency, with external moral identity motivation 
being most prevalent in the context of school and introjected motivation being most 
common in the context of peers (see Figure 2).  
 Taken together these findings clearly support the notion that internal moral 
identity motivation increases with age while external motivation decreases. 
Developmental change appears to be most pronounced in adolescence and early 
adulthood and reaches a plateau around the age of 25 years. This age period is commonly 
perceived as crucial for moral identity development, although later developmental change 
still can occur (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Krettenauer, Murua, & Jia, 2016). At the 
same time, context differences point to the importance of contextual support for internal 
moral identity motivation to occur.   
Conclusion and outlook 
 As described at the beginning, research on moral identity has been dominated by 
two major approaches, trait-based and socio-cognitive accounts. These two accounts of 
moral identity differ with regard to their theoretical underpinnings. At the same time, 
they lead to contrary predictions in regards of the context- and situation-dependency of 
moral identity. While trait-based approaches consider moral identity a stable personality 
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characteristic that is largely context independent, socio-cognitive approaches deal with 
moral identity as a highly malleable and fluctuating self-attribute. From a socio-cognitive 
perspective, moral identity is one particular self-schema among many others that needs to 
be activated in a given situation to exert any influence. The view presented in this paper 
takes a middle ground between these two extremes. It allows for some context-
dependency without assuming that a person's identity falls apart into bits and pieces. 
From a self-determination theory perspective, individuals strive for self-integration and 
consequently demonstrate some coherence in moral identity across contexts (see also 
Nucci, 2018).  
 The notion of an integration of morality and self has been at center stage for 
research on moral identity for a long time. According to this idea, it is the gradual 
integration of self and morality in the course of development that gives rise to a moral 
identity. Researchers employed different concepts as to what this integration of self and 
morality exactly entails. Blasi and Glodis (1995), for instance, described different identity 
modes, from defining one's identity through observable characteristics to managing and 
shaping one's identity by expressing one's core values and approximating one's ideals. 
Colby and Damon (1992) elaborated on the notion of an integration of self and morality 
on the basis of a qualitative study of moral exemplars. They found that moral exemplars 
expressed a marked unity between self and morality such that their own personal interests 
and desires were identical with what they perceived as morally desirable. Frimer and 
Walker (2009) further corroborate and expanded Colby and Damon's ideas. According to, 
Frimer and Walker's reconciliation model of moral identity development, human 
motivation entails a fundamental duality between agency and communion. Individuals 
MORAL IDENTITY AS A GOAL   21	
normally work towards either achieving their own goals or advancing those of others. 
This duality is overcome either by prioritizing one motivational system over the other or 
by reconciling the two. Reconciliation is the integration of agency and communion such 
that agential desires are fulfilled through the pursuit of communal concerns. According to 
Walker (2014), reconciliation of agency and communion is the hallmark of moral 
maturity. 
 The perspective taken in the present paper fully resonates with the notion that 
moral identity development is in the integration of self and morality. Yet, it does not 
assume that there are two broad psychological systems "morality" and "self" that become 
gradually integrated in the course of development. Rather it assumes that there is a 
specific goal of moral identity maintenance that becomes more internally motivating with 
development. At one particular point, however, the perspective taken in this paper clearly 
deviates from the models formulated by Blasi, Colby, Damon and Walker. All of these 
models assume that the developmental period of childhood is void of moral identity. This 
assumption is questionable on various conceptual and empirical grounds (see 
Krettenauer, 2014; 2018). According to the view promoted in this paper, children already 
possess a moral identity long before a fully internalized and integrated moral identity 
emerges in the course of the development. This moral identity is externally defined by the 
desire to meet the expectations of one's moral community. Empirical research 
demonstrates that children as young as 5 years of age try to manage their social 
reputation in their peer group by abstaining from antisocial behaviors such as stealing or 
cheating and by acting prosocially (Engelmann & Rapp, 2018). For example, children 
share more when they are watched by others even if the recipient is absent and the 
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observer is an unaffected peer (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012). This effect is 
stronger, when the observer is from the child's own in-group. These active attempts to 
maintain one's status in a group by acting morally are an important foundation for the 
development of an internally motivated moral identity as it emerges at a later point in 
development.1 An important crossroad along this developmental pathway occurs around 
the age of 8 years when children start to realize that they can strategically manage their 
social reputation by appearing moral to others without acting morally. If moral identity 
motivation has remained largely external up to this point in development, moral 
hypocrisy as defined by Batson (2016) may follow.  
 A major outcome of this paper, thus, is in the notion that moral identity comes as 
a goal of moral action. Individuals act morally in order to uphold their moral identity. 
However, they do so for reasons, which are more or less external and internal to the self. 
External and internal moral identity motivations are differentially linked to moral actions. 
Internal moral identity motivation gains importance in the course of development and 
likely dominates external moral identity motivation at later points in development. These 
claims raise many questions that need to be addressed by future research. For example, 
how does external moral identity motivation transform into internal moral identity 
motivations? What are the exact mechanisms? Does the reverse process occur, as well? 
Do both forms of moral identity motivation coexist in one and the same person? As SDT 
																																																								
1  It is important to note that the dominance of an external moral identity motivation at 
younger ages does not preclude the existence of other forms of intrinsic moral motivation 
in younger children. As argued in Krettenauer (2014; 2018) young children 
spontaneously engage in prosocial acts of helping, sharing and caring and are intrinsically 
motivated to do so. However, this internal motivation is tied to singular actions and not 
related to children's self-view or moral identity.  
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maintains, some aspects of a person's moral identity, particularly those that are more 
congruent with the basis needs for relatedness, competence and autonomy may be more 
internally motivating than others (see Avanitis, this issue; Besser, this issue). As a 
consequence, individuals' moral identity may blend external and internal motivations. It 
is evident that the two main approaches to moral identity, trait-based and socio-cognitive 
accounts, have very little to offer for addressing these questions. In view of this 
conclusion, it is fair to say that the SDT-perspective promoted in this paper offers a 
promising avenue for new research that significantly broadens the scope of studies on 
moral identity and its development.  
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Figure 2. External, introjected, identified and integrated moral identity motivation by age 
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